Social Voilence Called Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria: Some Thoughts

My earlier conceptualization of Boko Haram (available on my blogspot) is that it is an Islamic Social Movement which pulled around it the New Urban mass in Maiduguri and other towns/cities in that zone. Secondly, I argued that, unlike other similar movements before now, the Boko Haram does not have a vision and or a philosophy to capture state power and reconstruct it.

Indeed that history has disappeared, but another one with a new violence which some people still referred as Boko Haram is now on course.

The insistence without thinking, of referring to the recent violence as Boko Haram, inspite of differences in form, character, style and target with the earlier one in Maiduguri, is bound to raise in critical minds, fundamental questions.

So, how do we conceptualize Boko Haram as a process or social process, not merely in linguistic term.

The growth of cities in Africa, accompanied by expansion of the urban poor and masses, in the last fourty years has reminded me of what made the Communist Manifesto a popular reading in nineteenth century Europe. The reflections, by theoretical guide, of Karl Marx and Friedrick Engels in the Manifesto of Communist Party, are well documented by historians, observers and analysts of the development of Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. Works by Thompson E. P. (1963; 1971; 1978), George R. (1969), Dobb M. (1946) and Webb R. K. (1969) are few examples.

Indeed, the development in today's Northern Nigeria is distinct from that of Europe. In Europe was the period of the early development of capitalism. Yes! Characterized by dislocation of society, growth and expansion of cities, poverty, unemployment, etc. Varied reactions in form of riots, protests, all kind of disturbances including 'attack and ran', 'hit and ran' burning of churches, markets, and houses of the rich, etc.

In big towns/cities in Northern Nigeria as in some others in developing countries, the same experience but of different historical development is very common today. The history of growth of cities in Northern Nigeria is of colonization. Either as trading posts or administrative centres of colonial administration. Subsequently, they attracted the rural populations who migrated to the urban centres to live there. In the 1970s there was Government programme of industrialization and agricultural transformation. The former resulted in formation of mass of wage earners who live permanently in the urban areas. The latter through a land reform Decree and many larger-scale farm projects pushed more rural people to the urban centres.

During the same period there was expansion of education of all sectors. Thus, increasing the population of the cities. The informal sector of the economy had expanded too.

A development was set for urban crimes, organized violence, labour disputes, etc. However, capitalism of that era was more humane. State and capital could spend part of the surplus to provide welfare services. This facilitated for social control of the urban struggle.

Towards the end of the Twentieth Century through the Twenty-first Century, according to Robert Reich (2007) capitalism has become of big business and super. It must take away everything and will not give anything. It imposed market economic system everywhere in the developing world.

The New Economic System has become like colonization (Stephen S. 1998). Small capital cannot compete. Both traditional and modern local industries have collapsed. New type of industries which cannot absorb young graduates from tertiary institutions dominate. A new wage system which is like a slavery becomes the law of the work relations, etc.

The consequences are too much of unemployment. Employment is not a guarantee against poverty. Homeless and street boys have increased massively. They take over the major cities. These are the boys whom somewhere I have called neo-liberal youths (M. M. Yusif, 2011).

Therefore, the cities in Northern Nigeria today, have become like the city of London in the Eighteenth Century. With those kind of homeless and street youths and of the same behavior and way of life. As well as the same reactions to social relations of the economy in the society. Perhaps the only difference is as Thompson E. P. (1978) said, in London in those years there was class struggle without classes.

Could that be said in today's urban struggle in Northern Nigeria's cities? No! London in the eighteenth century was in transition to capitalism. But, Nigeria today is unquestionably capitalist. That is the reason why the behavior of the urban youths is not only against property, but also against the state, seen as the representative of the dominant class.

Again, super capitalism has made democracy superficial. No democracy is recognized except market democracy (Prezzorski, 2000), which promotes big business. This kind of democracy does not negotiate differences with other interests because it must take everything.

In view of the foreseen consequences – political and economic – of neo-liberal globalization, Ash N. R. (1999) predicted that twenty-first century would be a century of chaos and violence in human history. Even in the history of Europe, Robert C. (2003) noted that "the worst times in European history were in the fourteenth century, during and after the Hundred years war, and in the first half of the twentieth century. The twenty-first century may be worse than any of these" (Sic).

Thus, the Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria is first a social violence which arises from the internal contradictions of neo-liberal capitalist development in the region. In class society this kind of social violence may be an ideology and a political tendency of the oppressed social group who could not be heard or listened to get into dialogue with them. Furthermore, their social characteristics as homeless, street boys, unemployed, employed but still poor, petty owners who lost their properties, etc. placed them in a category of people who could not build or receive ideas of political struggle with the enemy, except just meaningless violence. They are not anarchists. Not syndacalists. Neither Islamic Fundamentalists.

Now, what are we going to say about many unspecified, uncleared and sentimental questions raised about this social violence? Such questions include:

1. That, are they sponsored by foreign interests?
   
2. Is this violence to weaken Northern Nigeria with intention to cause the breakdown of Nigeria as one national territory?
   
3. Is it a religious violence to create an Islamic state in Nigeria?
   

This is too simplistic. From the beginning it would be better to start from the internal dynamics, which may produce this kind of violence. I want believe that this development in Northern Nigeria is similar in many ways with what happens in Nairobi and other cities in Latin America.

In Nairobi, this youth's actions had started many years ago and had forced alliance of the elites against KANU which resulted in a new democracy in Kenya. The youth were celebrating the new democracy when the old practices of the KANU was coming back to scene. Now, they had launched another violence and are setting the elites again to accept rules of law in management of peoples affairs.

However, the social consequences of this kind of violence would of course be determined by internal dynamics and relations of forces. In a class dominated society, there are multiplicities of interests and each tries to realize its case. An internal may ally with external to win. Forces of disintegration may wish to seize the available opportunities. Islamic ideologues may not be left behind to capture trend of events in its favour.

It is very important to stress the point here that the said social violence in Northern Nigeria is an ideology or a political tendency of the new oppressed groups produced by neo-liberal economy. They are not clear about what they want, so in a class dominated society many other interests may want influence and or control them to achieve their aim.

This is a preliminary research outline for further investigation.

 

M. M. Yusif

Department of Political Science,

Bayero University, Kano – Nigeria

May, 2012