Tuesday 2 October 2007

Economic Crisis, Accumulation and Class Confrontation in Nigeria: 1979 – 83

Economic Crisis, Accumulation and Class Confrontation in Nigeria: 1979 – 83





By



Ma’azu Mohammed Yusif
Department of Political Science,
Bayero University, Kano

1985-08-14


Publication Type: Conference Paper





This paper is to be reviewed in the light of the development and changes of the twenty-first century. Meanwhile it should read as a twentieth century development on the issues
Introduction
The major objective of this paper is to attempt an analysis of the economic crisis which beset Nigeria from early 1981. Specifically the paper intended to highlight how the conjuncture of the processes of capitalist accumulation and class struggles generated the present crisis of Nigeria’s economy, which resulted in the Military Coup of December, 1983.

For the purpose of clarity, it is necessary to re-examine various radical interpretation of the current crisis. Suffice it to say, three theses underpin the most widely held radical conception of the crisis. All the theses subsumed their explanations, albeit in different perspectives, to the externality of Nigeria’s economy and its domination by foreign finance capital. It is therefore worthwhile to reassess the theses, as they are significant, not only for economic solution to the crisis, but also the political and ideological struggle of Nigerian workers against imperialism.

The first thesis focuses its analysis on the nature of the domestic bourgeoisie within the state machine, whose collusion with foreign capitalist groups is said to result in looting the country’s resources, leading to the present economic chaos1. Another variety of this thesis is that the Nigeria’s bourgeoisie is still in a primitive stage of accumulation, therefore plunder and mismanagement of the economy as happened, logically characterised its existence, in order to promote its development as a full pledged bourgeoisie2.

The second thesis is much informed by the ‘dependency and underdevelopment’ theory. Its underlying assumption which is even accepted by official diagnosis of the crisis is that it is caused by a world-wide depression which brought falling demands of Nigeria’s major foreign exchange earner i.e. petroleum3.

While the above theses might contribute to understanding the internal and external forces that informed the present economic crisis, they demonstrated lack of grip to the dynamic processes of expansion and contraction of capitalist accumulation, both internationally and nationally, the only premise of scientific interpretation of the economic crisis.

What is most striking in the arguments of the two theses: absence of “honest bourgeoisie” and “genuine accumulation”, and lack of demand respectively, portray an open abandonment of Marxist analysis of economic crisis.

In Marxist conception, economic crisis emanates from the upswings and downswings in the processes of capitalist production and the problem of realisation of surplus value4. This problem which is a permanent feature of a capitalist system is
“… influenced to a large extent by conflicts between capital and labour … in other words by class struggle”5

It can be glaringly noticed that the issue of class struggle as a determinant element in grasping the current economic crisis is absent in the explanation of the above two theses.

Politically speaking, this amount to class collaboration with the bourgeoisie class, and rationalising the present measures adopted by the military junta to salvage the capitalist economy, which is incompatible with the idea that there is irreconcilable conflict of interest between capital and labour.

In the third thesis, which is postulated by Yusuf Bangura, one can discern a Marxist analysis of economic crisis and its relevance to understanding the current economic crisis. Yusuf Bangura lucidly put the explanations of the crisis from the point of view of the crisis of global capitalist accumulation, resulting from the fundamental contradiction between capital and labour as well as “The contradictions between various arms of the propertied class for the expansion and retardation of the economy7”.

But how do these contradictions express themselves concretely to reproduce the current economic crisis? In a statement seems incompatible with his analysis, Bangura noted that:
“Because of the peripheral status of the LDC’s most of these contradictions are generated in the centre of economies of Western Europe, USA and Japan, which then transmit them to the less developed economies…”8

Furthermore, Bangura asserted that:
“… it is against the background of combined and uneven development that we can understand the way the crisis manifested themselves in the Nigerian economy”9.

The issue of unevenness of capitalist accumulation in the world capitalist economy is certainly a most scientific theoretical perspective to understand imperialist crisis of accumulation and how it is internalised within the Nigerian neo-colonial formation. But it is not adequate to argue that the specificity of the Nigerian economic crisis is generated and transmitted from the ‘centre of economies of Western Europe, USA and Japan’.

As Bangura sees the crisis transmitted from outside, his version of uneven development romances the conception of the term in the tradition of dependency and underdevelopment theory. The notion of uneven development in the theoretical perspective of dependency and underdevelopment theory:
“… disregards the leading principle of historical materialism that the mode of production determines the nature of social formation. It thereby bases itself upon the superficial peculiarities, the exceptional features of historical development instead of its general fundamental ones. Second the law of uneven development focuses on exchange rather than productive relations”10

To attribute the current economic crisis to problems of exchange of commodities between imperialist countries and Nigeria, or even to see production relations as something simply transmitted from somewhere else is to obscure the true content and class interests of the local bourgeoisie class and its alliance with imperialist finance capital in the exploitation of the Nigerian working-class.

What is therefore required is a correct identification of the position of various class forces in the scheme of the problematic of the current economic crisis. This is necessary, as not go astray to finding a correct political solution to the problem.

Accordingly, it is necessary to understand the specific features of the crisis within the context of entrenched pattern of capitalist accumulation, established by Nigeria’s state, domestic bourgeoisie in collaboration with international capital, and to analyse the social and political expressions of various class forces which determined the character of the crisis and also explained the emerging pattern of capitalist accumulation since December 1983 coup. The paper is therefore structured as follows:

Section one examines the established pattern of capitalist accumulation in Nigeria’s social formation before the setting of the current economic crisis. Section two looks at the setting of the economic crisis. The third section discusses government proposals to overcome the crisis. Section four examines the economic crisis and the dominant class. Section five studies the economic crisis and petty-bourgeoisie. Section six looks at the conditions and upsurge of Nigerian workers. Section seven discusses the military intervention in the light of relations of class forces created by the economic crisis. Lastly, is a conclusion.

Imperialism and Capitalist Accumulation
It is pertinent to stress our appreciation of Bangura’s analysis of the current economic crisis. But it is worthy to extend the analysis for its concretisation in Nigeria’s situation, taking into account how imperialist domination is internalised in Nigeria’s political economy, and the internal contradictions that generated the crisis.

As earlier mentioned the explanation of Nigeria’s economic crisis must be deduced from the law of uneven and combined development since Nigeria’s social formation is integrated into World Capitalist Economy. But how can this be correctly pursued, if one does not question Bangura’s assumption that the Nigeria’s economic crisis is transferred from Western Europe, USA and Japan?

Certainly the essence of imperialism is the expansion of capitalism from Western Europe, USA and Japan. But the problematic of Bangura’s analysis is how to space the role of National economies in the conjuncture of internationalisation and nationalisation of capitalist accumulation.

In a penetrating study about “Foreign capital and class formulation in Kano”, Rauf Mustapha amply documented with deep theoretical sophistication, how the logic of foreign imperialist domination, established its dynamics in Nigerias social formation. Referring to Bukharin, Rauf Mustapha noted that:


“It was not enough to understand the dynamics of capital in the international arena, as merely a project of the national economic of the monopoly capitalist systems”11

The point is that the internationalisation of capitalist accumulation creates its own logic and dynamics in national economies of neo-colonial societies to the extent that
“The national economies influence and are influenced by the World Economy”12

Secondly, the nationalisation of international accumulation makes it possible to specify the nature of class contradictions between capital and labour within respective nations.

Finally, we pointed out in another paper that the push of international capital to restructure the pattern of accumulation in Nigeria as a result of the current economic crisis, is simultaneously the desire of the Nigeria’s state and domestic bourgeoisie to transform capitalist accumulation from commercial to industrial13.

It is against this background I intend to examine the nature of capitalist accumulation in Nigeria from 1979-83. The alliance of foreign capital, Nigeria’s state and the domestic bourgeoisie entrenched a lopsided pattern of capitalist accumulation which informed the trends and nature of the current economic crisis.

Historically, the colonial state laid a foundation of this type of perverse pattern of capitalist accumulation. Initially, the logic of colonial capitalism to operate on the basis of “export-oriented” economy mainly cemented a form of capitalist development which gave priority to “non-productive”, “non-industrial” capitalist activities. Such a strategy of capitalist development, however, did not remain static. The colonial state in alliance with the emerging bourgeoisie established the basis of industrial accumulation, by expanding local production in the 1940’s. With rise to prominence of the “National bourgeoisie” after independence, and the growing strength of the post-colonial state, frontal efforts were made to transform the economy, in collaboration with foreign capital, into an industrial one. The basis of such transformation was largely established during the 1970s14. This accelerated the promotion of some sections of the domestic bourgeoisie into industrial activities.

Although Shagari Administration, which came in October, 1979 actually promoted industrial accumulation, the relations of class forces between the dominant classes on the one hand and the crisis in production processes and realisation of surplus on the other, retarded the ongoing dynamics of capitalist development on the basis of industrial accumulation.

This created a sharp contradiction between the state and capital. One aspect of this contradiction is the failure of Shagari regime to continue with subordination of labour started by Obasanjo administration. As will be shown in the following pages, immediately after Shagari took oath of office in October, 1979, he was confronted with various political and economic demands by Nigerian Labour Congress. Secondly, the political leadership of the state as from October, 1979 was characterised by dominance of a closely organised group with a business interest based on commerce. A content analysis of “Who is Who in Nigeria” (A Daily Times publication), provides an insight into the business concerns of Members of Shagari cabinet. The publication showed that only four of the 52 members of the cabinet during the first term of Shagari regime have business concerns in “Productive Capitalist” activities.

Thus even though the state promotes capitalist accumulation, the balance of class forces, and the nature of class contradictions between the dominant classes, made the state to disproportionately promoted commercial business.

In another paper, we presented ample empirical evidence on the development strategy and general commercial orientation of the economy during Shagari regime15.

The net effect of this pattern of accumulation is the underdevelopment of the manufacturing sector of the economy, especially the development of intermediate and capital goods sectors.

To give an example, if one compares, some major industrial groups to manufacturing value added in Nigeria, with five newly industrialising countries in Third World (Brazil, India, Mexico, South Korea, Turkey), Nigeria’s manufacturing exceeded the average achieved by the five other countries in only five industrial groups; beverages, tobacco, textiles, petroleum and coal products, and fabricated metal products. In another 22 industries (see table below), contribution to the manufacturing values added in Nigeria, fell short of expectations. Also, in the five other countries high concentration of value added (about 25-30%) is recorded in the food and textile sub sectors, while in the case of Nigeria, beverages which includes mainly beer, soft drinks, and spirits made the highest contribution (about 15.30%) to total manufacturing value added in the low range of between 1.2% and 4.9%. Furthermore, while basic Iron and Steel Industries contributed nothing to the manufacturing value added in Nigeria, the same item contributed 4.10% in Brazil, 5.7% in India, 3.89% in Mexico, 2.53% in the Republic of Korea and 6.7% in Kurkey16.

Comparison of contribution of some major Industrial groups to manufacturing Value Added in Nigeria and five other Countries in 1970
ICIS
Industries
Nigeria
Brazil
India
Mexico
Rep. of Korea
Turkey
Average
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
311
Food Manufacturing
11.73
13.32
8.31
18.24
14.13
15.94
13.61
313
Beverage Industries
15.30
2.27
1.16
2.05
4.50
4.35
4.93
314
Tobacco Manufacturing
8.67
1.41
4.27
1.02
3.80
13.02
5.36
321
Man. of textiles Man. Of wearing app.
14.79
9.14
21.77
9.94
15.70
13.92
14.21
322
Except foot wear man. Of leather and
0.51
1.68
3.79
8.09
6.70
2.34
3.85
323
Products of leather man. Of foot wear except.
0.51
0.63
1.63
1.43
0.33
0.40
0.82
324
Vulcanised or plastic footwear
1.02
1.65
3.61
5.02
0.66
0.91
2.14
331
Except furniture, furniture and fix.
1.53
2.53
4.23
1.54
2.89
1.41
2.35
332
Except primarily metal paper
0.51
2.05
0.80
0.51
0.53
0.20
0.77
341
Products printing publishing
1.53
2.59
1.28
2.46
2.28
1.72
1.98
342
Allied industries
2.04
3.58
2.09
3.07
3.15
1.51
2.57
351
Industrial chem.
0.51
5.83
4.03
2.56
6.45
0.81
3.36
352
Other chemical
0.51
4.87
4.68
5.22
3.82
3.83
3.82
354
Misc. product petroleum & coal
8.16
2.01
0.10
0.20
1.09
0.20
1.96
355
Rubber products
1.53
1.94
1.41
1.53
1.58
1.82
1.60
356
Plastic products not elsewhere classified
1.02
1.87
0.26
0.41
1.59
0.70
0.97
361
Pottery china and earthernware
0.51
1.39
0.45
0.10
0.45
0.91
0.63
362
Glass & glass products
0.51
0.94
0.85
1.64
0.77
0.80
0.92
369
Non-metallic mineral products
2.04
3.61
4.09
3.28
4.38
3.33
3.45
371
Iron & Steel basic industries
-
4.01
5.74
3.89
2.53
6.66
4.56
372
Non-remous metal basic products
0.51
4.01
1.34
1.33
0.34
1.81
1.56
381
Fabricated metal products
6.12
3.35
5.70
4.10
1.64
4.24
4.19
382
Machinery except electrical
0.51
7.35
4.08
3.07
1.93
2.62
3.26
383
Electrical machinery & appliances
0.51
5.34
3.33
4.81
4.17
1.82
3.33
384
Transport equip.
0.51
8.69.
3.34
6.66
5.44
3.33
4.66
385
Professional & scientific, measuring & controlling photograph & optical goal
0.51
0.95
2.55
0.41
0.30
0.10
0.81
390
Other manufacturing industries
0.51
0.95
3.13
1.74
3.32
1.20
1.90
Source: FRN, Fourth National Development Plan 1981 – 85 Vol. I pg. 172–173

Whereas the state under Shagari regime was expected to breakthrough such problematic by restructuring the economy to develop intermediate and capital goods sectors, and to promote export-oriented industrialisation, could not precisely do so because of the balance of forces at stake.

Furthermore two other factors added a new dimension to the frustration of the industrial sector of the economy. Firstly, the allocation of import licences apparently discriminated against import of capital goods that might dynamise the industrial sector. For example, during the 1981 financial year, the then Federal Minister of Commerce stated that a sum of N9.2 billion was spent on imports. Out of this amount N4.8 billion was spent on imports of cars, lorries and trucks, while the remaining was allocated for imports of Toys, television sets, Radio sets, Video tape, recorders, etc.17. Secondly, was the corruption and mismanagement that was used to siphon state capital that may otherwise be used to promote industrial accumulation.

Nigeria’s Economy in Crisis
Given its position in the World capitalist economy and the established pattern of capitalist accumulation, the Nigeria’s economy is beset by crisis from early 1981. The crisis, which brought extreme frustration to industrialists for failure to obtain foreign exchange to import crucial spare parts and raw materials for industrial production, the closure of industries, retrenchment of workers and frequency of work stoppages, the rising inflation, etc., heightened the class contradictions and struggles which created a climate propitious for a military intervention.

The features of the crisis began to show up during the early 1981 when Nigeria registered a huge deficit in its external transactions. Because of foreign control of Nigeria’s economy, and how this control has been internalised in Nigeria to produce relations of forces favourable to commercial accumulation during 1979-83, makes the economy susceptible to pressures emanating from the World capitalist system. For example, during the first quarter of 1981, Nigeria was producing about 1.97 million barrels of oil a day at the price of 40 dollars. But because of the international market situation, by the second quarter, daily production dropped to 1.42 million barrels, and further declined to 0.848 million barrels during the third quarter of the year, all at 40 dollars per barrel. However, during the fourth quarter, the price fell to 36.50 dollars, while production picked up to 1.539 million barrels a day. By March, 1982, production declined to about 0.7 million barrels a day and price also fell to 35.50 dollars per barrel.

In the face of this problem imports continued to grow while exports earnings was declining, causing a downward of the country’s foreign reserve and serious balance of payment difficulties.

By 1981, for example, the external reserves which were built up from 1979 to 1980 were drained when imports totalled N14.969 billion as against exports of N11.649 billion.

The effect of this is Nigeria’s deepening dependence in the global imperialist system as can be seen in the evolution of Nigeria’s external debt.



Federal Government Public Debt outstanding at the end of December 1980 (N million)

Table II
S/N
Type/Source
1978
(1)
1979
(2)
1980
(3)
Percentages
(1) & (2)
Change
(2) & (3)
1.
External
1,251.1
1,64.5
1,866.8
28.7
15.8
2.
ADB
-
-
2.5

-
3.
Canada
35.6
32.6
32.5
8.4
0.3
4.
Dumez
-
-
19.6
-
-
5.
Hungary
-
-
10.5
-
-
6.
IBRD/IDA
154.3
163.9
179.1
6.2
9.3
7.
Italy
11.3
10.4
9.6
7.9
7.7
8.
Japan
30.0
30.5
34.7
4.3
13.8
9.
Netherlands
9.4
9.0
8.7
2.5
3.3
10.
United Kingdom
43.0
42.4
38.0
7.2
10.4
11.
U.S.A I.D
0.6
49.3
49.1
-
0.4
12.
U.S.S.R.
34.1
0.6
-
577.7
-
13.
Western Germany
627.4
231.1
281.1
63.8
21.6
14.
Euro-Dollar Loan
259.8
1,027.8
1,090.2
94.6
6.1
15.
International
5,983.1
13.9
111.2
21.7
700.0
16.
Banking System
4,293.8
7,282.3
8,218.5
15.8
12.9
17.
Central Bank
3,197.3
4,965.6
5,793.1
20.3
16.7
18.
Commercial Banks
1,096.5
2,549.2
3,125.9
120.4
22.6
19.
Non-Bank Public
1,689.3
2,416.4
2,667.2
37.4
10.4
Total
7,235.2
2,316.7
2,4254
22.9
4.7
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report and Statement of Account for the year ended 31 December 1980.

As can be seen from the above table, there is rapid increase of external debt by the Federal Government. Between 1979 and 1980, the medium and long-terms external borrowing increased by 15.8 per cent. Whereas in 1980, external debt amounted to N1, 866.8 million, by 1981 it rose to N3.7 billion and almost N5.9 billion Naira in 1982. As at time of December 1983 coup, it was recorded that Nigeria’s external loan indebtedness reached N7, 624, 44 million. On adding short term trade debt of N3, 460.0 million, Nigeria’s total external indebtedness stood at N11, 085.44 million18.

In the midst of this crisis, state and capital (foreign and local) wanted structural adjustment of the economy, in order to augment exploitation, promote capitalist development, by expanding accumulation, as a way of resolving the economic crisis.
Government Proposals to Overcome the Crisis
The measures taken by Shagari regime to stop the drift into the economic chaos had actually demonstrated the inner cause of the crisis, as a crisis of capitalist accumulation. The policies that had been implemented were attempts by foreign and local bourgeoisie to arrest the crisis by restructuring the economy to expand the basis of capitalist accumulation.

These processes of capitalist structuring are found ready in the structural adjustment conditions of the International Monetary Fund. Contrary to the position that the IMF adjustment conditions can only succeed in frustrating local based industries and hence antagonised some sections of the domestic bourgeoisie, the IMF conditionalities streamlined industrial accumulation by a combined process of eliminating smaller industries and concentrating production in fewer firms to be reorganised for export-oriented manufacturing production19.

Specifically, the measures taken were two forms. The first was in the political sphere and the other in form of economic policy. A.R. Mustapha summed up the political strategy as follows:
“As a consequence of the effects of the economic crisis, and the established patterns of Nigerian political life, the Shagari administration… virtually killed “democracy”, while intensifying the drive towards repression… the specific policies adopted by the Shagari administration were the terrorisation of the population, using the notorious para-military mobile police force, which came to be known to Nigerians as “kill and go”20.

In the economic sphere, in April 19, 1982 the government issued provisional orders to enable the President to deal with the economic crisis. This came to be known as “the Enabling Bill” (Economic stabilisation Act, 1982). The bill authorised the President to issue Provisional Orders in respect of customs and excise duties, import and export prohibition and for other purposes in order to arrest the economic crisis.

The main portions of the Act are some fiscal and foreign exchange measures designed to conserve foreign exchange, as well as some anti-smuggling legislations. The specific orders issued under the Act include imposing excise duties on some goods; a general increase in customs on others; and some goods largely packaging and industrial machinery, hitherto under open licence were prohibited for import except under import licence. Furthermore, the Act included reduction of personal Travel Allowance from N800 to N500; reduce business travel allowance to N2, 500 and introduced compulsory Advance deposits of 50% on the importation of goods21.

As can be seen from the political strategy of Shagari regime to combat the economic crisis, state and capital was to impose its logic on labour by organised repression and subordination of the working-class.

On the other hand the economic stabilisation orders according to one industrialist are “… far too many and often contradictory of each other”22

For local industries, which under the circumstance of the current economic crisis the state

“…should have been able to look inwards to domestic industries for salvation”23.

In fact it has been suggested by Terisa Turner and Arnold Baker that the December, 1983 coup can be understood by the competition between commercial capitalists and those sections of the Nigeria’s bourgeoisie located in capitalist productive activities i.e., industry and agriculture. As they clearly put it:

“the coup was in favour of that faction of the international bourgeoisie which seeks to promote capitalist production in Nigeria’s Oil Agriculture and Industrial sectors”24.

Whereas the intra-bourgeoisie contradictions actually contributed to the understanding of the economic crisis and the class conflicts which led to December coup, as A.R. Mustapha correctly noted:
“There is a need to bring in other factors, such as the way in which the economic crisis has galvanised different sectors of the non-exploiting classes into political action…”25

The Economic Crisis and the Dominant Class
As earlier hinted, the Nigeria’s ruling-class is divided into different fractions. Initially located in commerce, bureaucracy and finance, the expanded reproduction of capital leads to a rapid growth of the domestic bourgeoisie in areas of industry and agriculture. We earlier postulated the political and economic hegemony of the commercial class during 1979-83 period.

Inspite of the hegemony of the commercial class, the National Party of Nigeria, a party controlling the Federal Government during our peiod of study, was undoubtedly a party with concentration of representation of all the fractions of the dominant class. The class fractions were already in disagreement over nominating and election of candidates to represent the party before 1979 elections, and also how Shagari manipulated the electoral process during 1983 polls26. The differences became sharper over the failure of Shagari administration to resolve the impending economic crises.

As earlier mentioned, the specific nature of the internal contradictions was a secondary one. First over the failure of Shagari to deal with growing radicalisation from the exploiting classes. Secondly, the industrial and agricultural fraction disagreed with the logic of implementation of the economic stabilisation measures to overcome the economic crisis.

The sources of these contradictions can better be understood by examining how some industrial groups and agricultural interests were put in disarray by the crisis.

The case of Textile Industry
It should be recalled that the Nigeria’s textile industry is one of the earlier industrial enterprises established during the colonial period.

Meanwhile, it had been established that local textile manufacturing was already thriving to the extent of competing with imported textile materials during the early colonial period. In Northern Nigeria in particular, Lord Lugard neatly mentioned that
Native cloth is manufactured in great quantities and competes favourably with Manchester cottons; … the dyes of Kano and other large cities supply local wants to the exclusion of imported goods; while the natron from the north-east permeates the whole protectorate, penetrating to Lagos itself, and fosters the native manufacturers which are largely, though not entirely, bartered in exchange for it”27.

As a result of the competition against the imported materials, and the need of finance capital to penetrate the Nigerian market.
“…the importing merchants would no doubt be to see native industries, other than the production of raw materials for export crushed, in order that they may be superseded by imported manufactures”28.

The colonial state, impose some restrictions on manufacturing and trading of locally manufactured textiles to encourage the imported materials to takeover the market. This facilitated the destruction of the local textile manufacturing and the taking over of the market by imported clothes.

The establishment of modern textile manufacturing enterprises after the second world war, followed the new strategy of foreign finance capital to expand local capitalist production in the colony.

A classical example of import-substitution industry, textile production is geared towards production for domestic market. In the 1960s, the state granted the industry a “Pioneer-status” leading to rapid growth of textile manufacturing concerns in the country. As early as 1975, the industry accounted for 16% of value-added and 25% of total employment in the manufacturing sector29.

The industry has the largest number of manufacturing establishments in the country. As of 1972, 447 establishments were recorded by Manufacturers Association of Nigeria30. Since then the number of enterprises in the textile industry has more than doubled.

The crisis which led to the collapse of native textile industries in early colonial Nigeria was different from the economic crisis which afflicted textile production in present day Nigeria. The former was a crisis of transition from pre-capitalist. Production processes into a capitalist system. The present crisis, as earlier mentioned is a crisis of capitalist accumulation.

In the early 1970s, the choking up of the internal market for textile products and the struggle of workers to force the textile magnates to implement Udoji awards resulted in crisis of over production and realisation of surplus, making many of the textile concerns to fold up and retrenched thousands of workers31. Although the oil boom of the 1970s reactivated the market the textile groups experienced another set back because of intensive competition from imported and smuggled textile materials, until Obasanjo came to their rescue in 1979 with ban on importation of all textile goods by declaring a war on smugglers who flooded the market with foreign made textiles, as well as by organised policy of subordination of labour through the re-organisation of the Workers Unions in the same year.

The difficulties for the textile manufacturers came to the fore once again from the beginning of the present economic crisis.

Gunilla Andrae and Bjorn Beckman suggested three factors which caused the frustrations of the textile interests during this period. One of these factors relates to the fundamental contradiction between capital and labour: the 1981 General Workers’ strike, demanding 200% increase in minimum wage and the subsequent government concession of 25% increment raised dissatisfaction from the textile magnates. Secondly, the rise of smuggling activities which eventually led to decline of the textiles market. More than 40% of the market was said to have been taken over by smuggled goods. Finally, in October 1981, the Nigerian cotton board declared a major increase in cotton price, which resulted in increase in cost of production32.

Summing up the crisis of the textile industry, as a result of the current economic crisis, Yusuf Bangura cited Business Concord reporting that
“The employment of textile workers fell from 200,000 in the 1970s to 80,000 in December 1983. About one third of the textile mills have temporarily closed down while the remaining two-thirds are operating at between 30% and 40% capacity. Some are operating in a three day week”33.

The Case of Savannah Sugar Company
The frustration of industrial interests during Shagari regime was also evident in industries largely owned by the state. This was the case with Savannah Sugar Company, Numan in Gongola State.

The Savannah Sugar Company is the largest enterprise in the country’s Sugar refinery industry. Established in 1970 as a joint venture between the then Federal Military Government and the Commonwealth Development Corporation. The ownership as at 30th September, 1980 is as follows:
Table III


%
Naira (N)
1.
Federal Government
75.4
47,120,000
2.
Borno State
5.8
3,634,000
3.
Commonwealth Development Corporation
5.6
3,500,000
4.
Bauchi State Government
5.3
3,298,000
5.
Gongola State
5.2
3,248,000
6.
Nigerian Industrial Development Bank
2.4
1,500,000
7.
Nigerian Agricultural Cooperative Bank
.3
200,000


100.00%
67,500,00
Source: Muhtari Maiha, Agricultural Development in Nigeria: A case study of the Numan Savannah Sugar Company Project, Unpublished B.Sc. dissertation, Department of Political Science, ABU, May 1981, P.39.

The establishment of the company included a proposal for an irrigated sugar estate and sugar mill with capital to produce 100,000 tons of refined sugar annually.

Although the project and the mill is largely owned by the state, it should be remembered that the state undertakes large projects in order to promote the interests of both foreign and local private capital. M.I. Maiha correctly noted this when he stated that:
“The project is now a dumping ground for the products of capitalist markets, for technical and farm implements. Technical equipments like agricultural machines, bull-dozers… are supplied by an agro-industrial transnational corporation in the United States…. The project also serves the commercial interest of national agro-industrial capitalists and subsidiaries of other multinationals”34.

The Savannah Sugar Company is also an import-substitution project, as such it was expected to substitute importation of refined sugar so as to reduce import of sugar and conserve Nigeria’s Foreign exchange.

In the face of the current economic crisis the company was virtually grounded. As in the case of textile groups, the struggle of Nigerian workers for increased wages and improvement of living conditions threatened the basis of accumulation by the agro-allied concerned, Alex Rondos clearly noted this point when he stated that:
“…there have been regular hitches in the release of funds, and state government, especially that of Gongola, the host state, has been keen to maintain a controlling interest in the project, while preferring that Lagos supply the Finance. In such inter-state co-financing arrangements an equally important issue is the choice of directors and chairman of the company who can balance the conflicting interest that often bog down such projects”36.

The case of Commercial Agricultural Interests
As was the case of industrial concerns, capitalist agricultural interests were put in disarray by the economic crisis. There were basically three major contradictions capitalist agriculture experienced as a result of the crisis. Two of these contradictions concerned the struggle between the different fractions of the dominant class. First was over efficient organisation of productive forces and secondly a problem of linking farm accumulation with accumulation of capital industrially. The other one was a principal contradiction determined by the relations between the principal classes in capitalist agriculture that is agricultural bourgeoisie and agricultural labour.

Stressing our own position while discussing the management of Bakalori irrigation project Bjorn Beckman noted that the contradictions among the bourgeoisie



“… contributed but it s less a matter of factions of the ruling-class having divergent interests than the failure of the people to enforce the logic of its own strategies on the people which are supposed to execute them. This may not add much in explaining the general orientation of the project, but it may help to explain certain aspects of its miserable performance”.37

The struggle between agricultural capital and agricultural labourers was the major factor that determined the specific crisis of capitalist agriculture in the current economic crisis. More than ever before, organised and spontaneous resistance by peasants was manifested in large-scale farming areas.

The type of capitalist expansion that has been taking place in the agricultural sector, with implementation of River Basin projects and the World Bank Rural Integrated programme has gradually eliminated ‘traditional’ rural wage labour38 which is a cheaper means of wage employment and more politically susceptible to control. Thus giving rise to emergence of a regular and permanent wage-labourers.

Under the conditions of capitalist farming and the economic crisis, provided a situation under which the class struggle manifested itself in the agricultural sector. One expression of the class struggle, as earlier mentioned is demonstrated by a number of peasant revolts. Secondly, was in mass rural-urban migration.

The issue of peasant revolts has become a common feature of Nigeria’s political economy so it needs not be restated here. Rural-urban migration created a shortage of wage-labour in large-scale farming areas which implied a rise n farm wages.

Farm wages in Agricultural Project Area:
HJRBP: Samawa Sector: A comparison of 1979 and 1983 Farm wages:
Table IV
Year
Season
Rate per day per labour
1979
Summer
N5.00
1979
Winter
N4.00
1983
Summer
N8.00
1983
Winter
N5.00
Source: Interview with some improved farmers, in Samawa Sector of Phase I, HJRB

The table above illuminates a marked increase of farm wages from 1979 seasons to the farm seasons of 1983. An interview with some improved farmers hinted the present writer that among other reasons, mass rural-urban migration during the 1983 seasons accounted for the tendency of rising farm wages from 1979-1983.

Faced with this condition, capitalist agricultural interests wanted the state to intervene more seriously to re-organise the overall production and labour process. This is to take a variety of forms. First by effective control over agricultural labourers and peasantry (including forceful evacuation of urban migrates to the rural areas which the present regime has already done).

Insofar, as Shagari regime could not enforce the type of discipline on the peasantry and urban migrants, the capitalist farmers expected a more satisfactory support in the following forms.

First, by re-organisation of productive forces through increased use of mechanisation to reduce reliance on living labour. But because of the overall relations of class forces within the state machine, and the society as a whole, this became practically impossible.

The other contradiction is over the problem of linking capitalist agriculture with industry to promote the development and consolidation of ‘Agrarian-Industrial-Complex’.

The promotion of AIC had for long been on Nigeria’s economic programme. The Industrial strategy introduced in the Fourth National Development Plan, assigned a special preference to agro-based industries, in order to establish the essential linkage between agriculture and industry to consolidate the development of the AIC.

But in the face of the economic crisis, and the political tendency of the forces within the state apparatus, such development had been undermined. This is largely attributed to the import preference of the state. Discussing the development and import, Gunilla Andrue and Bjorn Beckman argued that:

“Alternative sauces of domestic supplies are obstructed by taste preferences and rigidities in the linking of domestic producers and markets.”39

Thus, imported wheat not only took over the market for domestic producers but is also; “undermining the development of domestic productive forces.”40

Industrial and Agricultural concerns, who see the expansion of domestic production as the logical pattern to restructure accumulation process intensified oppositions against Shagari regime.41

Economic Crisis and the petty-Bourgeoisie
The nature of foreign capitalist activities in Nigeria also gives rise to the emergence of petty-bourgeoisie class forces. In the present context, the term petty-bourgeoisie is used in the original Marxian term to mean small-owners of capital or small-commodity producers in a society dominated by capitalist relations of production. The Nigeria’s petty-bourgeoisie may be broadly divided into four strata.
1. In the rural areas, there is a stratum of rich peasantry. Often called the kulaks
2. Urban small-scale manufacturers and artisans
3. Urban small-scale traders and
4. Middle cadre in government and companies administrative structure.

The political nature of the petty-bourgeoisie is that it is closely associated with the dominant class in the exploitation of proletariat and semi-proletariat. Nevertheless, their positions as small-owners of capital, and their subordination to the dominant class for their accumulation can create serious contradictions between them and the dominant class.

In period of economic crisis, like the one we are experiencing now, the position of the petty-bourgeoisie is endangered as it can be crippled and transformed into the ranks of the proletariat.

The Nigeria’s petty-bourgeoisie has actually undergone serious crisis due to the difficulties created by the conditions of the crisis. In analysing the position of the petty-bourgeoisie and their disillusionment as a result of the crisis, it is important to mention that it is the general logic of capitalist accumulation to promote and or eliminate the petty-bourgeoisie as a class.

The only section of the petty-bourgeoisie that seemed contented with the effects of the economic crisis was the kulalks. In fact the state agricultural programme of Green Revolution nursed this section of the petty-bourgeoisie to the extent that
“some climbed and left farming behind, to enter the commercial classes to become contractors and more recently manufacturers42”

Politically, speaking, two factors account to the above phenomenon. Firstly, the transformation of the agricultural sector gives rise to a group of dispossessed peasants in the countryside that poses a threat to the entire capitalist process. Thus it is frequently claimed that a strong contented kulak class can provide the necessary relations of forces to avert the threat of the dispossessed peasants to the capitalist system43. Secondly, because of the partisan political nature of Nigeria’s polity at the time, the dominant class fractions used the rural petty-bourgeoisie to mobilise the other sections of the peasantry for political support.

The general orientation of the economic crisis advanced the accumulation by the rural petty-bourgeoisie. It should be noted that grain marketing is one major area of economic activities by the kulaks. The impact of the crisis is a general rise in prices of grains and other local food items in the country. In 1981 for instance, prices of grains doubled over 1975 prices and as at 1983 the prices had actually trebled. This provided ample opportunity to the kulaks to enhance their accumulation process through grain trading.

Secondly, the economic crisis brought extreme hardship on the rural poor, many of whom abandoned or sold their small-holding to migrate to major urban centres. The implication of this to process of accumulation in the rural areas is a concentration of land-holdings in the hand of the rural petty-bourgeoisie who purchased the land to increase their holdings.

Farm Area and Farms by Tenure in Kano State: A Comparison of 1970/71 and 1971 – 80

Table V

Farm areas in %
1997/71
19971/80
1.
Inheritance
19.3
12.5
2.
Purchase
12.0
13.5
3.
Rented
1.8
3.9
4.
Traditional Rulers
7.0
2.2
5.
Household
-
-
6.
Others
-
-
Source: Rural Economic Survey 1970/71 and 1971/80 Kano State

As can be seen from the above table there is obvious trends towards concentration of land in the countryside as ownership by purchase and rent have increased while ownership on the basis of inheritance and by traditional authorities declined over the same period. This trend was accelerated as a result of mass migration of poor peasants to the urban centres as a result of the economic crisis.

The urban petty-bourgeoisie in small-scale production was affected by the economic crisis, due above to failure of the state to assist them financially. Furthermore, the small-producers were crippled when the Shagari regime raised the amount of investment to qualify for small-scale industry to N250, 000 thereby causing thousands industries to unfold and or merge by eliminating the weaker ones44. The small-scale traders were also frustrated by the nature of political patronage which governed distribution and circulation of commodities. As for the middle cadre civil servants, the economic crisis brought extreme hardship, especially by the failure of the state to pay workers salaries.

As a result of the pauperisation of the petty-bourgeoisie, they form a strong political opposition against Shagari regime.

Meanwhile, before the beginning of the economic crisis, when political parties were formed, the interests of the petty-bourgeoisie was largely represented by People’s Redemption Party45. Thus the oppositions of the petty-bourgeoisies found its expressions largely in the struggle of the PRP against the dominant bourgeoisie party controlling the Federal Government.

The political nature of the PRP petty-bourgeoisie opposition was brought out clearly by Alhaji Mohammed Abubakar Rimi, who clearly stated that:
“It has to be shown to artisans and petty-traders that any dream by them of becoming capitalists one day is becomingless and less realistic as the existing elites grab more and more political and economic power for themselves in the ensuring struggle of becoming rich over night46.

It can be seen from the above quotation, that the frustration of the petty-bourgeoisie and their oppositions in the face of the economic crisis, was nothing over the question of how to promote their accumulation tendencies.

From this perspective, one can easily note that the PRP petty-bourgeoisie radicalism and their call for a new social order, which reflected the sentiments of the working-class is essentially that of displacing NPN dominant bourgeoisie political party, in order to control the state apparatus to resolve the economic crisis in the vision of petty-bourgeoisie solution.

The limitations and the ideological nature of the petty-bourgeoisie opposition can be further illuminated by the following developments of the party’s oppositions against the dominant class.

Firstly, the opposition was bedevilled by intra-class squabble between the various sections of the petty-bourgeoisie. In an illuminating study about PRP politics in Kano, Sabo Bako noticed that when the party was fractionalised into two, also rep-grouped the petty-bourgeoisie strata into two.

On the one hand, the kulaks, the small-scale producers and the small-scale traders grouped as Mallam faction, while the bureaucrats grouped as Imoudo PRP47. This division reflected the position and interests of various sections of the petty-bourgeoisie in their relations with the dominant class. Sabo noted that:
“The fractionalisation of the petty-bourgeoisie was due to among other reasons, the insistence of the Imoudo PRP to continue the quarrel with the NPN, …while the Mallam faction just desired a unity with the comprador-class”48.

Secondly, it was a common knowledge that the opposition of the Imoudo faction of the PRP petty-bourgeoisie was made by alliance with same comprador-bourgeoisie in other political parties, in a movement called the Progressive Parties Alliance49.
Working-class Conditions and Class Struggle
The contradictions which emerged in Nigeria, causing the crisis and determining its dimension is fundamentally between labour and capital. As reiterated throughout the previous sections, the internal contradictions between the dominant fractions and the petty-bourgeoisie are merely over the appropriation of surplus value produced by the working-class to expand and promote capitalist accumulation by the dominant class and the petty-bourgeoisie. Comrade Mao Tsetung already reminded us that:
“…if in any process there are a number of contradictions, one of them must be the principal contradiction playing the leading and decisive role, while the rest occupy a secondary and subordinate position. Therefore, in studying any complex situation in which are two or more contradictions, we must devote every effort to finding its principal contradictions. Once this principal contradiction is grasped all problems can be readily solve”50.

It is worthwhile to stress that, the political oppositions of Nigerian working-class and semi-proletariat in the face of the economic crisis, and the failure of Shagari regime to bring that to political control, precisely defined the nature of the contradictions among the dominant classes. Once more, Mao Tsetung noted that
“In the process of development of complex thing, many contradictions exist, among these one is necessarily the principal contradiction whose existence and development determine or influence the existence and development of other contradictions. For example in capitalist society the two opposing forces in contradiction, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie form the principal contradiction. The other contradictions …are determined and influenced by this principal contradiction”51.

The Nigerian working-class has a long history of struggles against capitalist exploitation. The workers, through the central labour organisation were already prepared for a war with the Nigerian ruling-class as a result of the subordination and repression which preceded handing over power to civilian government in 1979.

It must be expressly emphasised that the combat of the Nigerian working-class to improve its living conditions and against subordination and repression meted on the working-class produced a crisis of capitalist accumulation in Nigeria’s political economy.

What added a new dimension in the relations between the two combatant forces was that the working-class demands included its long-term political interests. These political demands were agitations to repeal Trade Union Act No.31, section 11(i) which prohibits workers in insurance, banking, telecommunications, the armed force and police from belonging to trade unions. It also challenged the petroleum production and distribution (Anti-Sabotage Act No.15 of 1977, which classify strikes by tanker drivers and petroleum workers as criminals and subject them to imprisonment without trial. Also is the Trade Unions (Disqualification of certain persons) Act No.15 which prohibits eleven trade unionists from trade unionism for life.

The crisis which driven many firms out of business, especially those at weaker links of the capitalist system, sent hundreds of workers out of jobs. It was reported that by July 1983, a total of 105 firms had either shut down or operated at half capacity sending about 200,000 workers unemployed52.

If there is downswing in the economy and decline of production in selective industrial firm that would not actually amount to collapse of the economy as held by some opinions. One of the tendencies of capitalist crisis is that
“…each crisis encouraged the formation of large enterprises because smaller and weaker firms were the typical victims of economic hesitations and down turns, while stronger and larger firms survived to buy up and integrate the assets of their competitors”53.

It is against this background that one could notice mass turnover and huge profit declared by big capitalist firms, even at a time when the crisis had reached its peak.

Fifty Biggest Nigerian Companies

Table VI

S/N
Company
1983 Turnover
Net Profit
Profit Turnover
Earnings per share
Dividends per share
(N000)
%
K
K
1.
UAC
719,127
13,619
1.8
4.59
2.75
2.
SCOA
447,608
6,005
1.3
9.4
4.6
3.
P.Z
346,978
8,732
2.5
15.11
8
4.
Total
334,646
17,346
5.2
38.5
22.9
5.
Union Bank
323,178
30,611
9.5
56
15
6.
Nigerian Breweries
317,387
49,402
15.6
43.2
25.9
7.
UTC
311,520
11,561
3.7
14.7
8
8.
First Bank
306,771
29,850
9.7
45.1
18
9.
Mobil
283,445
13,870
4.9
20
11.95
10.
U.B.A
281,400
29,300
10.4
66
17.5
11.
Nigerian Flour Mills
264,863
9,856
3.7
19.7
10.0
12.
John Holt
264,633
10,148
3.8
17.6
7.5
13.
African Petroleum
250,128
11,927
4.8
-
13.25
14.
Guinness
240,347
31,724
13.2
32
19
15.
CFAO
226,376
1,490
0.66
3.82
8.50
16.
TEXACO
219,054
14,455
6.6
31.87
19.12
17.
Leventis Motors
202,619
1,433
0.71
4
2.25
18.
Coca Cola
210,770
24,241
11.5
36,90
18
19.
Food Spegazities
152,555
13,043
8.5
38.65
12.50
20.
R.T. Briscoe
142,462
9,643
-
-
-
21.
UNTL
139,501
2,441
1.7
6.48
-3.5
22.
Lever Brothers
182,963
10,149
7.6
14.o5
11.03
23.
INTRA Motors
124,576
4,325
3.5
11
5.4
24.
AGIP
119,816
4,104
3.4
19
11.8
25.
CADBURY
119,268
5,584
4.8
-
12-k
26.
Northern Nig. Flour
105,642
4,973
4.7
30.14
18
27.
ROADS
74,808
1,651
2.2
12.7
5.0
28.
N.T.C
71,045
5,481
7.7
11
6.5
29.
Beccham
70,010
8,379
12.0
26.2
13
30.
Leventis Tech.
69,489
.098
0.28
1.3
-
31.
G. CAPPA
59,299
2,293
3.9
22.94
13.7
32.
W.A. Portlanl Cement
57,441
7,078
12.3
-
-
33.
Chemical & All. Pro.
53,126
2,648
5.0
-
6
34.
INCAR Motors
52,912
.107
0.20
1,43
-
35.
Nigerian Hoechst
51,941
2.218
4.3
15.84
8.5
36.
COSTAIN
51,704
2,710
5.2
12.98
7.50
37.
Daily Times
51,476
1,068
2.1
19.93
4.0
38.
Golden Guinea
47,941
6,277
13.1
7.5
7.50
39.
Alprint
47,537
(564)
-
-
-
40.
Tate and Lyle
64,087
3,474
7.5
25
10
41.
Dunlop
45,975
.916
2.0
4.36
-
42.
k. Chellarams
44,344
1,312
3.0
23.5
3.05
43.
Dumez
43,895
1,807
4.1
6.9
2.0
44.
Cappa & D’Alberto
43,691
1,810
4.1
9.05
5.0
45.
Taylor Woodrow
42,544
(.510)
-
3.5
1.5
46.
Bata
38,255
2.721
7.1
23
4
47.
Bewac
37,031
(6,138)
-
-
-
48.
Metal Box
36,471
4,123
11.3
28.1
15
49.
Berger Paints
35,335
2,675
7.6
-
10
50.
Glaxo
33,430
2,183
6.5
9.28
5
Source: Business Concord, Friday, October 5, 1984

Furthermore, the crisis will certainly usher a new cooperation between the state and big capitalist firms. As in the case of Nigeria, the government interfered aggressively, through various political and economic policies to subordinate labour, in order to carry with limited oppositions the ‘merger process and expansion of the economy’.

The worker’s response to the situation had been to stage industrial strikes and work stoppages. Between 1979 and 1981 for example, there were 676 industrial disputes out of which 547 resulted in industrial strikers involving 724,746 workers.

This is most clearly demonstrated in the following table, which shows the number of strikers recorded from 1976-81.

Labour Disputes and Strikers 1976-81
Table VII
Year
Number of disputes
Number of disputes resulting in strike
Number of disputes resolved
Duration of disputes (day)
Number of workers involved
Total Monday last
1976
335
165
214
-
87,897
227,770
1977
386
172
125
576
143,103
453,246
1978
158
78
56
234
67,748
739,279
1979
218
156
105
617
223,691
1,526,475
1980
185
181
160
1,304
141,676
1,453,893
1981
273
210
130
1,198
359,379
2,618,878
Source: FRN, Quarterly Bulletin of Labour Statistics, The Federal Ministry of Employment Labour and Productivity, Lagos, 1983

Although the state made some concessions on the course of workers’ economic demands, it had continued to carry organise repression against the working-class.

Despite the massive display of force the struggle of the Nigerian working-class continued to intensify throughout the years 1982-83. Waves of strikes and work stoppages continued at industry level. Between this period an estimated 560,000 workers have been involved in strikes resulting in more than eight million man-days lost54.

Furthermore, organised agitations styled “FAR” AND “NOW” campaign (fight against retrenchment and non-payment of wages) was launched by the Nigeria’s Labour Union.

The rise in militancy was broadened to include revolts by urban semi-proletariat and the poor peasantry in the rural areas.

The response of the state to this upsurge of the working-class and semi-proletariat in the urban and rural areas was to step up the scale of its repressive actions.

It was against this background, state and capital turned to the military for a way out of the economic crisis.

The Military Struck: Class Struggle Matures
In the light of the oppositions, military intervention against the NPN government was not entirely out of question.

The class positions of Nigeria’s Armed Forces in the class structure follows neatly the class divisions in the society as a whole. Thus the class struggles that was facing the fabric of Nigerian society during 1979-83 period was faithfully reflected within the military. Thus quite a number of coup plots expressing different class positions were in the pipeline.

Initially uproars about the class conflict within the Armed Forces were associated with a coup plot by Junior Army Officers. The junior officers, in addition to suffering from the frustrations similar to the civilian petty-bourgeoisie witnessed how corruption of the civilian politicians enveloped the senior army officers. We must not be illusioned by the junior officers coup. In addition to absence of organised and conscious working class practice to link with them, they certainly share the political aspirations of the petty-bourgeoisies. While the junior officers coup did not occur, if it did, it would certainly be no more than coming to perch some decrees, kill some elements of the dominant class, disorganise and suppress proletarian movement and re-structure capitalist accumulation in their own vision.

Secondly, there was a proposal by the then President Shehu Shagari to handover power to his Army Chiefs. If this had happened, it would have meant a continued dominance of commercial interest under the military. This plan
“…leaked to former military leader Obasanjo, now a gentleman farmer. He immediately summoned Generals Buhari, Babangida, Jeo Garba (retired) and Lekwot (retired). The objective was to execute the long-planned military coup before it could be overtaken by any coup from either the junior ranks or from Shagari handing over to the defence chiefs”55

When the Buhari coup occurred, it was swift and decisive. There was no major opposition to the coup. Infact, all section of the bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeoisie, workers, students, etc. demonstrated support for the new military leaders.

The coup announcer, Major-General Sani Abacha, pledged intervention on behalf of the workers. But it was actually the interest of capital caught in secondary contradictions that sued for change in political leadership.

The coup emanated from secondary contradictions and conflicts among the dominant class over the rationale of resolving the economic crisis. First over class confrontation from the working-class and the need of state and capital to firmly control labour to increase production of surplus-value. Secondly, over the right economic restructuring to be carried in order to intensify appropriation of surplus value and expand capitalist accumulation.

We pointed out in another paper that the coup represented an attempt by Nigerian state, domestic bourgeoisie and international capital to restructure capitalist development on the basis of industrial accumulation. This form of adjustment is proceeding by a frontal effort of the state to promote export-oriented industrialisation. This will follow the pattern already established in countries like South Korea, Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan, Turkey to mention but a few56.

Conclusion
Two questions need to be raised in our concluding remarks. First, which kind of balance of class forces reappeared after December 1983 coup? Secondly, having seen the position of various class forces in relation to the economic crisis, how can it be overcome?

As far as the first question is concerned, we pointed out elsewhere that the common interests of state and capital to restructure the processes of capitalist accumulation have not entirely eliminated conflict between them. At the same time, despite coercion of the working people, these are still perceived by state and capital as a fundamental threat to the adjustment programme of the economy57. In our own opinion, we feel that with capitalist class somewhat divided, the Nigeria’s working-class can forge a stronger unity to continue with their struggles for economic and political rights.

Secondly, powerful body of arguments have been advanced in many National conferences about the current economic crisis and how to overcome it58. How beautiful and progressive the suggestions put in these conferences to solve the crisis, are for short-term interests of Nigerian people. It is our committed opinion that solutions must be recommended to extend to long-term political interests of Nigerian workers, against capitalist exploitation and for construction of socialism.

Footnotes
1. This explanation is put forward in various articles by Y.B. Usman. See for instance his Middlemen, consultants and the solutions to the current economic crisis, Ife Lecture series No.1, University of Ife, Ile-Ife, Monday, 23 January, 1984.

2. For the other version of the first thesis, see Eskor Toyo, Imperialism, Primitive Accumulation and Third World Countries, Mimeo, n.d.

3. Most discussions about the genesis of the current economic crisis in national seminars and Newspapers addressed to this kind of analysis. In particular mention can be made on the seminar on the nations economy organised by the Academic Staff Union of Universities at Benin (1984).

4. For a concise details of Marx’s analysis of capitalist crisis see chapters 4,5,14 and 18 in Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism, New Left Books, London, 1980.

5. Ibid. P.149

6. Yusuf Bangura, The Nigerian Economic Crisis: Contending Explanations official policies and alternative solution, paper presented to the conference on World Resession and the crisis in Africa, University of Keel, England, 29th-30th September, 1984.

7. Ibid, P.19

8. Ibid. P.21

9. Ibid. P.23

10. This quotation is cited from George Nevack, Understanding History, Pathfinder press, New York, 1972, P.160. See the same book for discussions about the conceptual problem of uneven development.

11. Abdul Raufu Mustapha, Foreign capital and class formation: A Kano case study, unpublished M.Sc. dissertation, post-graduate school, ABU, June 1983 P.28

12. Ibid. P.29

13. Ma’azu Mohammed Yusif, The Rise of Industrial Bourgeoisie. The 1983 coup and the prospects of Dependent industrialisation in Nigeria, paper presented at the Nigerian Political Science Association Conference, University of Ilorin, 7th to 12th May, 1985.

14. For an elaborate discussion of this policy of the 1970’s. See Yusuf Bangura, Nationalism, Accumulation and Labour subordination in Nigeria 1970-98, paper presented at the annual conference of the NPSA, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, 7th – 11th May, 1985

15. M. M. Yusif op. cit PP. 9 – 12.

16. Date obtained from the same source Table I.

17. Time International, Vol.5 No.47, Monday, August 13th Sunday, August 19th, 1984 P.7.

18. New Nigerian, Monday, April 2, 1984, P.5

19. Some analysis of IMF activities in Third World countries embraced the idea that IMF adjustment conditionalities kill local industries and blocked local capitalist industrialisation in neo-colonial countries. See for instance, Chargl Payer, The Debt Trap: The IMF and the Third World, Monthly Review Press, New York and London, 1984. experience has however, proved this position wrong, as the whole package of the IMF conditions serve to extend foreign imperialist interest of expanding export-oriented industrialisation in neo-colonial societies. See Robin Broad, “The transformation of the Philippine Economy” Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine Vol.36 No.1

20. Abdul Raufu Mustapha, Repression and the Politics of Crisis Management in Nigeria, Paper Presented at the conference on the World Recession and the crisis in Africa, University of Keele, England, 29th – 30th Sept., 1984 P.5

21. See Sunday Standard, May 29 and July 31, 1983

22. Akin, George, West Africa, 17 January, 1983 P.160

23. Ibid., P.160

24. Terisa Turner and Arnold Baker, Soldiers and Oil: The 1984 coup in Nigeria, Mimeo, University of Port Harcourt June 1984 P.2
25. Abdul Raufu Mustapha op. cit., 1984 P.4

26. The disagreement among the dominant class fractions was noticed in the National Party of Nigeria, when in 1979, a group popularly known as the “Kaduna Mafia” presented Alhaji Adamu Chiroma as against the candidate of ‘feudal-oriented’ fraction, Alhaji Shehu Shagari. In Kano state, the same contradiction appeared when the Aristocratic commercial class nominated Alhaji Sule Gaya who was defected by the ‘Mafia candidate, Alhaji Ibrahim El-yaqub to contest for the gubernatorial seat under NPN ticket. See, Sabo Bako, The Peoples Redemption Party and Class struggle in Kano, unpublished M.Sc. dissertation, ABU Zaria, Second edition, September, 1983 P.191

27. This quotation is cited from Marion Johnson, “Cotton Imperialism” in West Africa”, in African Affairs, 1974 P.183
28. Ibid., P.181

29. Cited from Gunilla A. and Bjorn B., Labour and Industrial crisis in the Third World. The case of Nigerian Textiles and cotton. Project proposal and outline, University of Stockholm and ABU: June 1984

30. Manufacturers Association of Nigeria, Nigeria Industrial Directory, Lagos, 1972

31. For an account of the decline of the internal market and the worker’s struggle to implement Udoji award, see Paul Michael Lubeck, Early Industrialisation and social class formation among factory workers in Kano, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, post-graduate school, North-western University, June 1985 PP. 18 – 19.

32. Gunille A. and Bjorn B; 6984, op cit. P.13

33. Yusuf Bangura, 1984, op cit. P.33

34. Muhtari Idi Maiha, Agricultural Development in Nigeria: A case study of the Numan Savannah Sugar Company Project, unpublished B.Sc. Dissertation, Dept. of Political Science ABU Zaria, May 1981 P.43

35. Alex Rondons, “Sweet and slow at Savannah” in West Africa No. 3332 8 June, 1981 P.1274

36. Ibid., P.1274

37. Bjorn Beckman, Bakalori; peasants versus state and capital, paper presented to the Annual Conference of the Nigerian Political Science Association, Ilorin, May 1985 P.38

38. By ‘traditional’ rural wag-labour we refer to earlier proletarian formation in the rural areas. See for example Louise Lennihan, Problems of structures and Agency in Agrarian History: The question of Agricultural Wages Labour in Northern Nigeria, paper presented at the Workshop on state and Agriculture in Nigeria, Alumni House, University of California, Berkelay, May 7-9, 1982

39. Gunilla A. and Bjorn B. The Wheat Trap: Bread and under-development in Nigeria, project proposal and cutline, January, 1981 P.1

40. Ibid., P.2

41. Bjorn Beckman, Public Investment and Agrarian Transformation in Northern Nigeria, paper presented to the workshop on State and Agriculture in Nigeria, University of California, Berkelay, May 7-9, 1982 PP. 11 – 12

42. M. M. Yusif, Op. cit. 13-16

43. See Harry cleaver, “Will the Green Revolution Turn Red”, in Steve Weissman (ed.) The Trojan Horse, Ramparts Press, Son Francisco

44. FRN, The Shagari Administration; Facts and Figures of Development: Industries Vol.11, Lagos, P.11

45. For an illuminating study about the class character of the PRP see Sabo Bako op. cit.

46. Alhaji Muhammad Abubakar Rimi, Labour Union and Party Politics, Being a public lecture delivered in Calabar, Cross River State under the auspices of the Nigerian Union of Journalists (Cross River Branch) on Thursday, March 25, 1982 P.7

47. Sabo Bako op. cit.

48. Ibid, P.70

49. For an excellent analysis of the political and ideological underpinning of the Progressive Alliance, see Harbent Ckwe-Ekwe, Nigeria Now on “Progressives”: Noted for Observation, paper presented at the seminar on “Towards a Progressive Nigeria”, Tchad Hall, Bagauda Lake Hotel Kano, December 16-18, 1982.

50. Mao Tse-tung, On Contradiction, Selected Works Vol. I, Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1975, P.325

51. Ibid., P. 331

52. Yusug Bangura, 1984 P. 33

53. Gordon D., “Stages of accumulation and long economic cycles” in T.K. Hopkins and I. Wallerstein (ed.) Process of the World-System. Severely Hills, Sage, 19 1980 P. 73

54. Du Bois, “Nigeria – which Way Forward”? in The African Communist, The African Communist, No. 94 Third Quarter 1983 P. 72

55. Terisa Turner and Arnole Baker op. cit. P. 5

56. M. M. Yusif op. cit. PP. 16 – 22

57. Ibid., PP. 22 – 25

58. For an example of some suggestions in one of many national conferences held in 1984 see ASUU, How to save Nigeria, being text of communiqu̩ of ASUU conference on the State of the Nigeria Economy, held at the University of Bening, Benin City, April 9 Р13, 1984