Khomeinis State: Some Preliminary Propositions

Khomeinis State: Some Preliminary Propositions By M. M. Yusif Paper presented at postgraduate Discussion Group Department of Political Science Bayero University, Kano The confusion which surrounds the conception of Islamic state stands on the way of any meaningful analysis of state behaviours in Islamic countries. This state of affairs is precisely due to our inability to recognise the difference between the conception of state and the form and behaviour of government. In view of this, it is pertinent to start by making an essential observation about the problematic of Islamic states. Because this will enhance the level of our discussions. The study will therefore concern itself with the character of the state in post-revolutionary Iranian society. I must however, admitted that the title of this paper which is suggested as ‘Khomeinis state seems ambitious and vague especially when it is to be presented in a political theory class. Hence I will limit myself to examining the forces of the revolution which brought the Mullahs into power and whether in the light of the new opposition, the clerics could retain political power. It is fashionable in the Islamic academic circles, whenever we discuss social, political and other theoretical questions about the state, to trace it either in Quran or Sunna or to a sectarian interest of certain Islamic movements. Even the recent revolutionary philosophical interpretation of Islam is trapped in the same tradition. The reason is undoubtedly not unconnected with the manner Western idealist philosophy informed Islamic political thought. In concrete term, a state can better be understood by examining its class configurations rather than looking at its juridico-political superstructures. Therefore what makes Islamic state different from a non-Islamic one is only at level on which Islam has become important at political and ideological superstructures of the former. Islamic values and principles are only meant to justify the political domination of the ruling class. Hassan N. Gandezi clearly demonstrated that despite the Islamicity of Pakistan and Iran, there isn’t any new awakening of moral consciousness within the framework of Islamic morality. He further argued that even if such phenomenon certainly occurred, does not appear to be a natural experience given the legislation of harsh punishment and executions in both two countries1. Coming back to the issue of state more clearly, Engels definition is adequate: “The state is by no means a power forced on society from without; just as little is it the reality of the ethical idea, the image and reality of reason, as Hegel maintains. Rather it is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But in order that these antagonisms, these classes with conflicting economic interest might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it became necessary to have a power, seemingly standing above society, that would alleviate the conflict and keep it within the bounds of order; and this power, arisen out of society but placing itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it is the state”2. This definition is also applicable to early Muslim states as well as modern ones like Iran. Although Iran had experienced a revolutionary upsurge, that would not preclude class rule. Like early Christianity was the ideology of feudal aristocrats in pre-capitalist Europe, early Islam was connected with merchants and traders in ancient Arabian society. Maxime Rodinson has shown the mercantile nature of ancient Arabian society, the system of land ownership and various forms of exploitation of the peasants3. Early Islamic movement progressively fought against practices which impoverished and oppressed the peasants, thereby putting an end to obstacles which surrounded progress in trade and commerce hence enhancing the mercantile operations of the business community. Islam also provided legitimacy for the hegemony of the merchants. Thus Maxime Rodinson stated: “Religious jurisprudence condemns practices that might disturb the free play of supply and demands. A tradition… derived from the prophet himself condemns obligatory price-fixing, that is the ‘maximum’, the laying down of price-levels by authority”4. The ruling class of the early Muslim states sustained their power largely by the surplus generated from trade. This is the reason of the Arabs expansion to Persia and other parts of the world. Collapse of trade would therefore entail that of the merchant class and their state apparatus. This precisely happened with European imperialist penetration. This disintegration of early Islamic states was a result of the growth of capitalism in some parts of the world and the appearance of capitalist exploitation of one country by another, which negated mercantile exploitation. Since then socio-economic changes as well as development of ideas, including Islamic ones can only be analysed in relation and or response to capitalist exploitation. Some Reflections on the Role of Shi’I Clergy in Pre-revolutionary Iranian Society Since the disintegration of early Islamic state, Iran was first a semi-colony of both Russia and Britain which came to an abrupt end after the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, and then as a neo-colony since from the time of the Dictatorship of Reza Shah. Shi’ism was forcibly imposed as a monolithic national religion during the Safavid hegemony in the sixteenth century. The radical tradition of Shi’i Islamic sect has for long provided ideological and political doctrine which opposed colonial domination. The clerics played a prominent role in the nineteenth-century protests against economic and political concessions made to non-Iranian nationals, particularly with their leading role in the Tobacco protest of 1891-92. The Mullahs, whose economic base was eroded as a result of the development of capitalism, especially in the rural areas and whose religious roles undermined by westernisation of culture fought side by side with the emerging bourgeoisie against feudal monarchy during the constitutional Iranian revolution of 1906-1911, which succeeded in destroying the dictatorial rule of the Qajars dynasty and secured a share for the bourgeoisie in the government. Later in Reza Shah’s period the Shi’i clerics religious and economic base was further frustrated which made them to team up with Mossadeq’s nationalist front. The triumph of the comprador bourgeoisie with 1953 overthrow of Mossadeq national front government revived the cleric’s oppositional politics leading to their eventual seizure of power in February 1979. The Post-revolutionary Iranian State The development of Iran as a semi-industrial society since the American backed comprador coup against the ‘National front’ government of Mossadeq in 1953 magnified the contradictions that hitherto existed in Iranian society. Bizhan Jazani identified the major qualitative changes and the main features of Iranian economy which include the growth of consumer comprador class, unprecedented increase of foreign investments and American control of the economy which weakened and ruined indigenous businessmen’s ambitious agricultural projects and which dispossessed the peasants and hence denied the Shi’i clerics traditional source of revenue; and the growth of slums of lumpen elements in major cities of the country5. The regime of Shah Pahlavi employed terror to suppress any opposition. Trade unions were closely supervised by the state. The Labour Law even stipulate that names, birth certificate particulars and even photo-graphs of all trade union officials must be given to the ministry of labour6. The reason is that they can be rounded up more easily by SAVAK if they happen to misbehave. The revolutionary forces which brought Khomeini to power gathered momentum as a logical result of a national alliance of all oppressed people against the dictatorship of Shah Pahlavi. The opposition was sharply divided into two ideological camps, even though differences were muted for tactical reason to overthrow the Shah. The different camps were those representing the revolutionary aspirations of the workers who wanted to advance the revolution to a higher level and the non-proletarian forces which include the Mullahs, whose being in the opposition was mainly for a type of Islamic reform. The character of the post-revolutionary state depends precisely on the ideological force which got an upper hand during the course of the revolution. In this respect the non-proletarian forces of the Mullahs did succeed in consolidating and taking over the state apparatus during the course of the revolutionary upsurge. The other non-proletarian forces in the revolutionary front largely comprised of the lumped elements in the cities and Bazaaris who formed the large majority of the opposition. These groups were mesmerised by clerical agitation around the themes of Islamic charity and voluntary equalisation of wealth. Indeed, it was these desperate layers of the urban poor and small-traders who provided the strongest mass support for the Muslim Mullahs. Islam had thus become a force in the opposition against the dictatorship of the Shah. Ayatollah Khomeini was reckoned as a stubborn opponent of the regime. His agitation for Islamic republic has been an integral part of the revolution. He succeeded in consolidating his position among these groups, before and during the course of the revolution. As Nikki Keddi clearly demonstrated the urban small-traders often held weekly “religious meetings in homes which provided an ideal network for discussing political problems and tactics7. Ayotallah Khomeini was not the only strong opposition Mullah. Others included Shariati Madari, moderate constitutionalist who remained distant from Khomeini without breaking with him in that he agrees that Islam could be a revolutionary source. Madari rallied mostly conservatives and moderates around him, while lower Mullahs with populist tendencies were around Khomeini. Telqani also played a prominent role in the revolution. Being a more socially conscious Mullah, he links up with religious groups and non-religious organisations. Aware of the danger of a priestly class, Telqani affirms that in politics the ulamas must not have a special privilege, but to sit at the same level with others in assemblies. Some educated elites, who are not ulamas also joined the opposition from Islamic point of view, by giving Islam new definition to suit modern world. These include Mehdi Bazargan and Abolhassan Bani Sadr. Bazargan addresses chiefly to merchants and civil servants, while Abolhassan became the ideologue of young revolutions revolutionary intellectuals in line with contributions of late Dr. Ali-Shariati who is generally considered as the father of Iranian revolution. This uneasy alliance between the Mullahs and the new educated Muslim intellectuals formed the motive force of the Iranian revolution. The non-Islamic forces of the national opposition had no alternative but to join in a subordinate relation the populist leadership of the Mullahs, young Muslim intellectuals and urban small-traders, partly because of their organisational problems and partly because it was the most tactical alternative at the moment as the Shah’s Bureaucratic allies and the comprador capitalist forces were equally struggling to arrest the revolutionary uprising by instituting a compromise government as signified by the short-lived Bakhtiat administration. Also, there was a hope that the revolutionary current might be advanced as Ayatollah declared that ‘revolution only began with the Shah’s expulsion’. The alliance of the new Muslim intellectuals with the Mullahs in controlling the state apparatus, under the Islamic Republican party came to an end in 1981 with ouster of Bani Sadr as president of the Islamic republic. The popular forces in the Mullahs front, that is the lumpen elements in the cities and the small traders also feel extremely antagonised, precisely as a result of mass repression of what the clerics called unislamic practices. This ushered a new open opposition against the Mullahs, bringing the silent left back into militant oppositional politics. In conclusion, I can safely assert that the anti-imperialist alliance which brought Khomeini to power has now virtually broken. The Khomeini administration has shifted its base from the forces of the people which brought it to power to that of the Iranian big bourgeoisie with all its link with imperialism. Bani Sadr clearly demonstrated this when he stated that: “Khomeinis base is more among the dependent section of the big bourgeoisie. They make more profits under Khomeini than they did under the Shah. They are helping the clergy to establish their dictatorship but hoping to take over themselves at a later date…”8 Footnote 1. H. N. Gardezi, “The resurgence of Islam; Islamic Ideology and encounter with Imperialism”: Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 12 4(1983) P. 451 2. Cited; Lenin, Selected Works Vol.2, Progress publishers, Moscow 1963 P. 241 3. M. Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, Penguin 1964, chapter 3; also see I. M. Raana, Economic System under Umar the Great, Lahore, 1970 4. Ibid, P. 34 5. B. Jazani, Capitalism and revolution in Iran, Zed Press London, 1980 chapter 3 6. CARI, The Iranian Working-class: a survey of conditions, repression and struggle, London 1977 P.20 7. N. R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, Yale University Press, Yale 1981 P. 245 8. Merip Report, Vol. 104 (1982) P. 6